Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Ence v. Ence : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Carolyn D. Zeuthen; Martin W. Custen; Marquardt, hasenyager & custen; Attorney for Appellant.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ence v. Ence, No. 950829 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7058

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

BniEr

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DOCKET NO. ^&C%1£\ —

WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH,
Plaintiff /Appellant,

Priority No.

%4

vs.
LARRY D. ENCE,

Case No. 950829-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, PRESIDING

Carolyn D. Zeuthen #5020
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellant
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Mary C. Corporon #734
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Martin W. Custen #0785
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellant
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

3 1996
J

EALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH,
Plaintiff /Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ENCE,

Case No. 950829-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, PRESIDING

Carolyn D. Zeuthen #5020
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellant
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Mary C. Corporon #734
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Martin W. Custen #0785
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellant
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

.......

1

POINT I: THE FACTORS IMPORTANT IN FIXING AN
ALIMONY AWARD CANNOT BE INHERENTLY FOUND IN
THE TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE
........ 1
POINT II: THERE IS NO ENTITLEMENT TO LONG TERM
ALIMONY IN UTAH . . . . . .
5
POINT III: IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE TO USE
GUIDELINES WHEN AWARDING COMPENSATION
ADJUSTMENTS

7

POINT IV: AN EQUALIZATION OF INCOME APPROACH
SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE .

9

POINT V: THERE SHOULD BE NO AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN THIS ACTION
CONCLUSION

11
13

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Bell v. Bell
810 P.2d 489 (Utah App, 1991)

11

Godfrey v. Godfrey
854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993)

2

Jones v. Jones
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

. 1-3, 6, 7, 13, 14

Marshall v. Marshall
288 Utah Avd. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 1996)
Martinez v. Martinez
754 P. 2d 69 (Utah App. 1988)

2, 11
4, 5, 9

Martinez v. Martinez
818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991)

3, 4, 7-10

Roberts v. Roberts
835 P.2d 193 (Utah App. 1992)

2

Statutes Cited
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-3

11

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(1)

7, 8

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(7) (d)

9

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(7)(e)
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5-7(h)

. . 3, 7, 13
. . . . . 6

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 34

ii

. . . . . . . . .

13

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
:

LARRY D. ENCE,

Case No. 950829-CA

Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Comes now the appellant to the above-captioned matter
(hereinafter "wife"), by and through counsel, and submits the
following as her Reply Brief of Appellant herein:
ARGUMENT
I. THE FACTORS IMPORTANT IN FIXING AN ALIMONY AWARD
CANNOT BE INHERENTLY FOUND IN THE TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE
The Jones factors cannot be inherently found in the Findings
of Fact; rather, they must be explicit.
1072 (Utah 1985).

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

Mr. Ence, (hereinafter "husband") acknowledges

that the trial court did not specifically categorize its findings
as Jones factors but they were sufficiently detailed and
comprehensive to support the award of alimony.

However, the

findings quoted by husband only state facts as to the parties'
ages, gross income, net income and duration of marriage.
(Appellee's Brief, at 14/ Findings of Fact #13, R. at 101 - 102).
This is not the specific information needed to allow the court to
1

analyze the required Jones factors in setting alimony.

Marshall

v. Marshall. 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 1996) .
Husband argues that inherent within the testimony lies his
need for alimony.

The Jones factors cannot be found inherent in

the testimony or evidence.

Rather, the facts and reasons for the

court's decision must be set forth fully and be adequate enough
to show that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based.
1992).

Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah App.

In Roberts, the trial court made findings on the parties'

gross income in relation to its child support calculation.

The

Court of Appeals held that gross income was not enough, there
must be adequate findings on the parties' needs, and a comparison
of their relative abilities to provide support.

Roberts v.

Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198.
Likewise, in Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App.
1993), the trial court's findings on income alone were
insufficient to ensure that it used its discretion rationally
based on the three Jones factors. Even though the trial court
found that Mrs. Godfrey was a well and able bodied person,
earning $23,000 per year and Mr. Godfrey was earning $45,000 per
year with restricted income ability, these findings were found
insufficient by the Court of Appeals. Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854
P.2d at 589.
In the present case, the court based its alimony award on a
reasonable standard of living for husband even though the court
had no evidence of husband's needs. Thus, the court was unable
2

to say how it arrived at the alimony award or even what
relationship the award had to husband's needs.

If the court

considered facts in the record bearing on the Jones factors, as
husband has asserted, it failed to enumerate what those facts
were and how they were applied to the Jones factors. Thus,
summarization of the evidence in counsel's closing statement does
not take the place of the court's own analysis.

(Appellee's

brief at 18).
Husband argues that the trial court based the alimony award
on the parties' specific situation as presented in the record.
However, the parties' specific situation warrants an alimony
analysis under 30-3-5(7)(e) (Supp. 1996).

Thus, the trial court

failed to determine what relationship the alimony award had to
husband's actual contribution to wife's enhanced earning power,
if any.

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991).

As to husband's contributions, he states in his brief that
the parties' savings were used to assist wife in pursuing her
education.

There is nothing in the testimony or exhibits

indicating that any of the parties' savings were used to assist
in wife's education.

The facts, instead, show the contrary:

while wife was attending school, husband managed to maintain his
retirement accounts and the parties saved enough to purchase a
home in Tucson with a $10,000 down payment.

(R. at 253; Tr. at

130) .
Husband argues that his income and earning ability has
decreased as a result of supporting wife in her pursuit of her
3

education, or that his income is static at best. Nowhere in the
testimony or exhibits is there evidence of these allegations.
Although husband alluded to the instability of employment in the
construction industry in his testimony, there is simply no way of
knowing what husband's employment situation would have been if he
stayed in Arizona instead of moving to Utah or if wife had not
pursued her education.
best.

Husband's argument is speculative at

Furthermore, husband states in his brief that he was faced

with non-union jobs in Utah.

However, husband actually testified

at trial that the construction jobs in Utah were "rare union
jobs."

(R. at 272; Tr. at 149).

Husband contends that the alimony awarded to him is based
upon the partnership theory of marriage and that the trial
court's findings relate that theory specifically to the facts of
this case.

However, husband does not explain the partnership

theory of marriage and fails to notice that Martinez specifically
rejected a commercial partnership theory of marriage as being
unjust as it could deny a spouse any award of support or
property, irrespective of need and the other person's ability to
pay.

Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541.
Husband argues that his is clearly a case in which his

efforts and sacrifices helped to relieve wife's burden of
supporting herse]f and the children and allowed wife to devote
most of her time and attention to her education.

However, it is

interesting to note that in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d at 76,
n.8, the Appellate Court when considering the wife's contribution
4

to husband's education, discussed whether Dr. Martinez would or
could have entered and completed medical school had his wife
obtained a divorce earlier.

The court implies that Dr. Martinez

would probably not have been able to attend medical school
because of child support and alimony payments he would have been
required to pay.

This discussion helps to show Mrs. Martinez's

contribution to her husband's education.

The present case is the

opposite of the Martinez situation because it is apparent that
wife would have and could have attended medical school if she
divorced earlier.

Since she was home with the children, she

would have had custody and been awarded child support.

Since she

would have been in need of assistance, she would have received
alimony.

And, she would have been able to obtain the same

student loans to pay for her tuition and school expenses. This
shows that husband's contributions of support were not more than
his legal obligation.
II.

THERE IS NO ENTITLEMENT TO LONG TERM
ALIMONY IN UTAH

Husband's discussion of cases where the courts have
overturned awards of temporary alimony and awarded permanent
alimony misses the issue altogether.
through 24).

(Appellee's brief, pg. 20

Husband overlooks the fact that the spouses in

these cases had minimum work experience or medical problems and
were unable to provide sufficient income for themselves. These
are not the circumstances in the present case. Both parties here
are equally self supporting and employable.

Neither party needs

the support of the other to develop an employable skill or to
5

maintain a particular standard of living.
Husband argues that the cases cited by wife showing the
evolution of case law in Utah on the issue of alimony may be seen
to stand for the proposition that when the marriage is of long
duration, in which both parties sacrificed and worked toward the
common good of the family, the spouse with the smaller earning
potential should be entitled to long term (if not permanent)
alimony.

(Appellee's Brief at 20).

Nowhere do these cases even

suggest that proposition, let alone specify it.

Instead, these

cases show that the wife spent most of her life providing
services to her family with no monetary reimbursement, had either
minimum work experience or none at all and is in her late forties
or fifties at the time of divorce.

These women are unable to

enter the job market and support themselves anywhere near
resembling the style in which the couple had been living.

Rather

than awarding them alimony because they are entitled to it, the
court awarded support because of their needs, seeking to mitigate
the economic harm that divorce had on them.
Thus, spouses with a smaller earning potential do not
automatically receive permanent alimony or long term alimony
without an analysis of the Jones factors.

Further, husband has

overlooked the fact that the trial court in the present case did
award long term alimony to husband and the maximum amount under
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5-7(h) (Supp. 1996).

6

III.

IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE TO USE GUIDELINES WHEN
AWARDING COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS

Husband argues that the Utah courts and Utah Legislature
have refrained from requiring strict guidelines in alimony awards
and marital property distributions, relying instead on equitable
principles.

In divorce actions, equitable principles are

required pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-5(1) (Supp.
1996).

Other than the factors enumerated in Jones, there are no

additional guidelines to aid a court in considering and in
awarding compensation pursuant to § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996),
which only requires a court to "consider" a major change of
income due to the collective efforts of both spouses. There is
no requirement that the court actually compensate a spouse. The
court in Martinez only states that in making a compensating
adjustment, the award must have some relationship to the
receiving spouse's actual contribution to the enhanced earning
power or to that spouse's needs. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 at
541.

(Emphasis added).
If the trial court in the present case was making a

compensation adjustment in its award of alimony, it failed to
show what relationship the amount of the award had to wife's
enhanced earning power as well as husband's needs. A more
equitable award would result if guidelines were established to
show the relationship of the amount of the award to actual
specific contributions of support.

For instance, the court could

award the supporting spouse one-half of his or her earnings for
the period in which he or she supported the student spouse while
7

in school, plus any school related direct costs such as tuition
and books.

For non-monetary contributions, the court could set

some limits as to the amount of the award.

Strict guidelines

would not be needed, but an award would be equitable because
actual contributions would be reimbursed and actual sacrifices
recognized.
The purpose of alimony, however, is not reimbursement and
the Supreme Court in Martinez makes that clear by striking down
"equitable restitution" in favor of equitable provisions under
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1).

As to reimbursement, the

Martinez court is not in favor, stating:
The efforts each spouse makes for the other
and for their common marital interests cannot
be quantified in monetary terms, their
respective contributions netted out, and a
balance struck at the termination of a
marriage. The very idea of marriage
contemplates mutual effort and mutual
sacrifice. . . . the spouse's contributions
cannot be reduced to a common denominator
that allows for a valid comparison in
monetary terms. Martinez, 818 at 540 - 541.
Because alimony is intended to be based on actual need and
ability to pay with the purpose to provide one spouse with
sufficient income to obtain the necessities of life, it is
clearly not equitable to award one spouse an excessive amount of
alimony for a long period of time without any consideration of
that spouse's actual need and standard of living.

Both spouses

in a marriage have an equal duty to support their families and,
if one spouse is a student and not contributing support, that
alone should not result in a future claim by the other spouse for
8

unpaid past support.
IV. AN EQUALIZATION OF INCOME APPROACH SHOULD
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE
Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-5(7) (d) (Supp. 1996), states
"The Court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living."
Husband relies on Martinez in support of his claim that the
trial court erred in failing to equalize the parties' respective
income levels. Husband states that the fact situation in this
present case is precisely the type of situation described in
Martinez, so equalization of income in this case is proper.
However, husband fails to show how the facts in the Martinez case
compares with the present one, where Mrs. Martinez had only
worked outside the home for a very short time and had limited job
skills.

Moreover, Martinez does not employ an equalization of

living standards approach.

Dr. Martinez was earning $120,000 per

year at the time of divorce and the court of Appeals awarded Mrs.
Martinez $750 per month permanent alimony, which is hardly close
to equalizing income. Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 75
(Utah App. 1988) . This amount of alimony was not overturned by
the Supreme Court in Martinez 818 P.2d at 543. Martinez holds
only that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to try to
equalize the spouses' respective standards of living. Martinez,
818 P.2d at 542.
The circumstances which make it appropriate to equalize
income are in cases where the recipient spouse had either become
or always was severally economically disadvantaged as a result of
9

having not worked either at all or substantially, outside of the
home during the marriage.

Wife has thoroughly discussed the

equalization of living standard of approach in her brief and it
is not necessary to repeat it.

(Brief of Appellant, at 23

through 26).
It would be an impossible task to attempt to equalize the
income in the present case, or in any case where there is an end
of the marriage drastic income change for one of the parties due
to an enhanced earning ability acquired during the marriage. Any
attempt to do so would be inherently unfair, ignoring principles
of equity established throughout years of case law.

Not only

would the court be forced to speculate as to what the standard of
living would be, it would have to use the equalization of
standard of living approach to reward a spouse for sacrifices or
contributions of support while the other one acquired an advanced
degree.

This is not allowed by the Supreme Court in Martinez.

In this case, husband seeks to benefit from wife's medical
degree by mistakenly claiming that her recent change in earnings
entitles him to alimony based upon a standard of living which he
never had and which would give him an income to which he had
never grown accustomed.

Husband claims that his standard of

living is the standard of living that he might have enjoyed if
the parties had not divorced.

Since it is impossible for the

court to determine how the parties standard of living might have
been, as there is no way of knowing how they may have spent their
income, any standard of living determination on that basis would
10

be highly speculative.
V.

THERE SHOULD BE NO AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
IN THIS ACTION

Husband argues that he should be reimbursed for attorney's
fees incurred in this action because he is in need of financial
assistance and the requested fees were reasonable.

The trial

court awarded husband attorney's fees of $1,000 although he asked
for $3,000.

Wife has paid the .$1,000 in attorney's fees as

ordered by the court and husband has accepted this sum.

Wife has

not appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
The trial court has authority to award attorney's fees in a
divorce action pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3 (1995).

Bell v. Bell,

810 P.2d 489 (Utah App, 1991) specifically outlines the factors
that need to be presented by way of evidence before an award of
attorney's fees can occur, i.e. (1) the financial need of the
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the other spouse to pay; (3)
the reasonableness of the requested fees.

The failure to

consider any of the enumerated factors is ground for reversal on
the fee issue. Marshall v. Marshall, 288 Utah Adv. at 9.
Furthermore, it is an abuse of discretion to award less attorney
fees than that requested.

Bell, 810 at 494.

In Bell, the issue

on appeal was whether or not the court could reduce the amount of
fees that were being requested without some specific finding and
remanded that issue for that reason. IcL
In the present case, the trial court entered the following
Finding of Fact regarding attorney fees:
11

The court finds that the defendant's
attorney, Mary C. Corporon, has charged a fee
in this matter of $150 per hour, which the
court finds to be a reasonable fee for an
attorney of her experience practicing in this
community in the field of contested domestic
relations law. The court finds that it is
reasonable, just and proper that the
plaintiff should pay a portion of defendant's
attorney fees in the sum of $1,000, and that
the defendant should pay the remaining
balance of his attorney fees. Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law #15.
In its ruling the court found the rate charged for
attorney's fees was reasonable, and stated the following:
The court believes after I have done some
adjustments, after the alimony award, that it
would be appropriate for the plaintiff to pay
$1,000 towards defendant's attorney's fees.
And that plaintiff should be responsible for
her own attorney's fees. (Tr. at 59).
It could be inferred from this statement that the court
awarded less attorney's fees than husband requested because of
the large amount of alimony awarded, but it is not clear if this
was the court's intent. What is clear, however, is that there is
a paucity of evidence showing husband's need for the requested
fees.
While there is evidence of husband's income at trial, there
is no evidence of his monthly living expenses which is required
to prove need.

Husband testified as to his monthly rent for his

trailer home ($500), and he was ordered to pay one-half of the
monthly mortgage payments on the parties' Tucson home until it
was sold (approximately $350 for husband's share), but this
evidence is ineffective to portray regular monthly needs.
Even though the trial court concludes that husband's
12

attorney's fees were "appropriate," this is not the standard and
there is no finding regarding his need for such an award.
Furthermore, the record is clear that no evidence was presented
as to his need for the court to consider. As a result, the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are insufficient to allow
a meaningful review of the trial court's ruling.
attorney fees to husband in full.

Wife has paid

This court should affirm the

award of attorney's fees and award no fees on appeal based on
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
Neither the evidence nor husband's own testimony show his
need for alimony.

The trial court failed to analyze the Jones

factors in making the alimony award but attempted instead to base
the award on a reasonable standard of living for husband without
a detailed analysis showing how it arrived at the amount and
duration.
This court should determine that an equalization of income
approach is not appropriate or possible in this case because it
would be unfair and highly speculative.

Because wife's increased

earnings occurred at the end of the marriage, the fact situation
in this case calls for an alimony analysis under Utah Code
Annotated § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996).

Such an analysis would

determine whether wife's enhanced earning potential is due to the
collective efforts of both parties.
This court should establish general guidelines which a trial
court can use if it finds a compensation adjustment is
13

appropriate.

If this court awards compensation to husband, it

should determine what efforts husband has made to wife's
education and compensate husband with an amount which directly
relates to his support during the time wife was going to school.
This court should affirm the award of attorney's fees and
award no fees on appeal. Husband has shown no need for such fees
as required.
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests that this court
analyze the issue of alimony under the appropriate statute after
a consideration of the Jones factors and substitute its own
judgment for that of the trial court.

Further, this court should

affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees and determine
that there should be no attorney's fees awarded on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1996.
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CAROLYN D7
Attorney for
Wendalyn Smith
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